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A seven time Mr. Olympia Champion and former chairman of the Presi-
dent's Council on Fitness,' Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's physique was
a fixture of action packed blockbusters of the 1980s, 90s and even as recently
as 2010.2 In these movies, Schwarzenegger was larger than life, playing char-
acters who could break a man's neck while seated on an airplane, knock a
camel unconscious with one punch,' and impale a villain with an exhaust pipe
while advising his foe to "let off some steam."' As the star in Predator, deter-
mined on terminating a murderous alien, Schwarzenegger's character notes
that " [i]f it bleeds, we can kill it"' and also tells a guerilla soldier to "stick
t B.A. The Catholic University of America. J.D. The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law, 2011. Joseph wishes to express gratitude to Erica Wisniewski,
his family and friends for their love and support. Thanks also to Michael Zolandz of SNR
Denton LLP for his valued First Amendment expertise and his colleagues on the COMMLAW
CONSPECTUs Editorial Board for their guidance, patience and insight.
I See History of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports (1956 - 2006),
THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON PHYSICAL FITNESS AND SPORTS, available at
http://www.fitness.gov/5Othanniversary/toolkit-firstfiftyyears.htm (last visited May 14,
2011).
2 The Expendables: Get Out the Body Bags, THE GUARDIAN FILM BLOG,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/filmblog/20 10/jun/I 5/the-expendables-violent-films-
sylvester-stallone.
3 Was the Camel-Punching Man Imitating Schwarzenegger?, LA TIMES BLOG (May 6,
2008, 12:27 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/unleashed/2008/05/needs-edit-was.html.
4 See footage from Schwarzenegger's performance in Commando available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsfvnThuml&feature=related.
5 See Memorable Quotes for Predator (1987), INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
available at http://pro.imdb.com/title/tt0093773/ (last visited May 14, 2011).
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around" after pinning him to a wall with a knife,6 in addition to coming "back"
twice to portray a killing machine in the Terminator films. Schwarzenegger's
association with aggressiveness has continued through his political career, and
he frequently uses memorable lines from these films to interject humor into
speeches.' It seems ironic that Schwarzenegger has become a vocal combatant
against the video game industry, particularly in the fight between the State of
California in its efforts to label certain video games as too violent for youths,
and the video game industry, which insists that such labeling requirements are
unconstitutional.
In Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether video game
associations have the right to injunctive relief under a California statute that
restricted the sale of "violent video games" to minors and imposed a manda-
tory labeling requirement on games in conformance with the State's definition
of violence.! This comment will examine the Ninth Circuit holding' and argue
that, pursuant to First Amendment precedent, the Supreme Court of the United
States will affirm that video games are entitled to First Amendment protection
and are immune from content-regulating legislative measures. While the Su-
preme Court has a wealth of precedent that addresses obscenity and speech
advocating violence, it has yet to rule on whether the expressive content of
virtual violence in video games is entitled to First Amendment protection. The
Court will likely endorse holdings of other federal circuits pertaining to regula-
tion of video games, leading to the first Supreme Court case concerning video
games in the area of First Amendment law. This will likely be a victory for the
video game industry as well freedom of expression in modem visual arts.
Part II examines the Schwarzenegger v. EMA case. This section begins with
6 Id. at 6
See Matea Gold and Joe Mathews, Film Persona a 'Double-Edged Sword' for
Schwarzenegger, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2003),
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/sep/26/local/me-amold26 ("Schwarzenegger speaks of his
intent to 'terminate' the car tax and says he'll be known as 'the Collectionator' as governor
because he will squeeze more money out of the federal government."); see also Martin Kas-
indorf, Schwarzenegger's American Dream, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/state/2003-09-24-schwarzenegger-
american-dream x.htm (noting that "[i]n one ad, [Schwarzenegger] repeats a line that ech-
oes the Terminator's 'I'll be back' and 'hasta la vista, baby."').
8 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2009)
(discussing the portion of the statute requiring that each "violent video game" imported into
or distributed in California be "labeled with a solid white '18' outlined in black," which
shall appear on the front face of the game's package and be "no less than 2 inches by 2
inches" in size"); see also Linda Greenhouse, The Court As Mr. Fix-It, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2010, at Al9.
9 Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 556 F. 3d at 954 (holding for video game association
plaintiffs).
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a review of the California violent video game statute that spurred the Enter-
tainment Merchant Association's injunction and concludes with a discussion of
the controversial Ninth Circuit ruling-that the statute violated the First
Amendment. Part II discusses prior First Amendment law. Specifically, it re-
counts the history of Supreme Court rulings in various areas of expression and
examines the development of video game precedent in the federal appellate
courts. This section also discusses the history of speech and expression regula-
tion, traces precedent on political speech and artistic expression, and outlines
the regulation of expression in various entertainment mediums. Part III ana-
lyzes the evidentiary standards and judicial review involved in First Amend-
ment litigation, as well as the instant case. This section provides insight into
the evidence the parties relied upon in the lower courts, and discusses whether
states can justify regulating certain games based on content. Part III also exam-
ines the questions presented by the Supreme Court relating to Turner Broad-
casting v. Federal Communications Commission deference and causation. Part
IV examines the matter as it has progressed at the high Court and predicts the
Court's ruling in light of the arguments of the parties, amici and oral argu-
ments. This section concludes with an explanation as to how the unique crea-
tive outlet of video games bodes well for pro-First Amendment video game
association plaintiffs. Part V suggests that the video game associations will
prevail. While the Court will decline to create a new exception for violent vid-
eo games, they will likely leave open the opportunity for legislatures to draft
more precise statutes. In doing so, they will likely stress that more causal evi-
dence linking the games to demonstrated harms could enable states to make it
"to the next level."
II. SCHWARZENEGGER V. EMA: THE VIDEO GAME STATUTE AND
HOLDING OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. The Video Game Statute
The Schwarzenegger v. EMA case began as a facial challenge to a California
statute regulating video games.'o California Assembly Bill 1179, signed into
law on October 7, 2005, by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, sets forth that a
''person may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent to
a minor."" Consequently, persons under the age of 18 may not purchase games
labeled as violent by the State. California State Senator Leland Yee, a staunch
1o Id. at 953.
1 Id. at 953; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1(a) (West 2009).
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advocate of video game regulation,12 introduced the bill and elicited Governor
Schwarzenegger's strong support of the legislation." Senator Yee asserted that
state regulation in this area was necessary, arguing that "playing violent games
leads to increased physiological arousal, increased aggressive thoughts, in-
creased aggressive feelings, increased aggressive behaviors, and decreased pro-
social or helping behaviors." 4 The California legislature characterized violent
games as those which give players the option to "kill, maim, dismember, or
sexually assault the image of a human being."" The relevant portion of the
statute states that a game is violent if it:
(A) Comes within all of the following descriptions:
(i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a
deviant or morbid interest of minors.
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is
suitable for minors.
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors.
(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images of human be-
ings or characters with substantially human characteristics in a manner which is
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved in that it involves torture or serious physical
abuse to the victim.'6
The statute specifies a series of factors designed to assess whether a game is
especially violent." To this end, the statute defines "cruel," "depraved," "hei-
nous," and "torture"" and it enumerates descriptions of violence, each relating
12 Leland Yee Urges Parents to Avoid Violent Games for Holiday Gifts, GAME POLITICS
(Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.gamepolitics.com/2008/11/28/leland-yee-urges-parents-avoid-
violent-games-holiday-gifts. Senator Yee, who authored the legislation, cautioned parents to
avoid buying the games as holiday gifts, noting that "[ejighty-seven percent of children
between 8 and 17 years of age play video or computer games and about 60 percent list their
favorite games as rated M for Mature, which are games designed for adults." Id
13 Governor Schwarzenegger plainly and openly acknowledged his support for the stat-
ute. John M. Broder, Bill Is Signed to Restrict Video Games in California, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
25, 2005, at All (quoting Schwarzenegger as saying that "[m]any of these games are made
for adults and choosing games that are appropriate for kids should be a decision made by
their parents").
14 Violent Video Games: Sales to Minors: Hearing on A.B. 1179 Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 2005-2006 Regular Session (Sep. 8, 2005) (statement of Assembly member Leland
Yee), available at ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1151-
1200/ab 1179 cfa 20050908_123731 sen comm.html.
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746 (d).
16 Id
'7 Id. § 1746 (d)(3) ("Pertinent factors in determining whether a killing depicted in vid-
eo game is especially heinous, cruel, or depraved include infliction of gratuitous violence
upon the victim beyond that necessary to commit the killing, needless mutilation of the vic-
tim's body, and helplessness of the victim.")
18 Id. § 1746 (d)(2) (defining "[t]orture" as including mental as well as physical abuse of
the victim. In both cases, the virtual victim must be conscious of the abuse at the time harm
is inflicted; the player must specifically intend to virtually inflict severe mental or physical
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to violence toward human-like figures." For example, a video game is consid-
ered violent if there is serious physical abuse toward a virtual victim or gratui-
tous violence upon a victim beyond killing including, "needless mutilation of
the victim's body" as well as "helplessness of the victim."20
The statute's definition of "violent" outlines a range of states of mind for the
video game player, as well as various levels of consciousness for the virtual
victim.2' By delineating a video game player's potential state of mind, the stat-
ute distinguishes physical acts of violence from more extreme types of physical
abuse such as torture, noting that "serious physical abuse, unlike torture, does
not require that the victim be conscious of the abuse at the time it is in-
flicted."22 However, the participant must "virtually intend" to inflict the harm.23
Stores that sell the "violent" video games in violation of the statute are sub-
ject to a civil fine of up to $1000.24 The statute exempts non-managerial em-
ployees who sell the game and does not impose liability if there is a reasonable
mistake as to whether a patron is a minor.25 Retailers may avoid liability if they
"reasonably rely" on a patron's driver's license or other government issued
identification.26
B. Federal District Court Litigation and the Ninth Circuit Holding
Almost immediately after the statute was passed,27 the Video Software Deal-
ers Association28 filed suit against Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Cali-
fornia Attorney General, and three city and county officials in their official
capacities.29 Plaintiffs requested to enjoin the video game statute on the ground
pain or suffering upon the victim, apart from killing the victim.); see also id. § 1746
(d)(2)(D) (defining "serious physical abuse").
19 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746 (d).
20 Id. § 1746 (d)(1)(E)(3).
21 Id. § 1746 (d).
22 Id. § 1746 (d)(2)(D)-(E).
23 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746 (d)(2)(D)-(E).
24 Id. § 1746.1(a); id. § 1746.3.
25 Id. § 1746.3; id. § 1746.1.
26 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1(b).
27 The statute was passed on October 7, 2005. Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 2, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F.Supp.2d
1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C-05-4188).
28 The Video Software Dealers Association ("VSDA"), "a division of the Entertainment
Merchants Association (EMA), is the not-for-profit international trade association for the
$24 billion home entertainment industry." See What is the Video Software Dealers Associa-
tion?, THE INDEPENDENT DEALERS OF ENTERTAINMENT,
http://www.idealink.org/Resource.phx/public/aboutvsda.htx (last visited May 14, 2011).
Throughout this Comment, references to Plaintiffs refer to the VSDA at the lower court
proceedings and the EMA at the Supreme Court level.
29 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 951-952; see also
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that it was facially invalid, based on content regulation premised on Califor-
nia's categorization of video games as violent and harmful. They also argued
the statute unlawfully compelled speech with its new labeling requirement,
which obligates game companies to place large font lettering on their product
that denotes the video game as violent.3" Plaintiffs argued that the content-
regulating aspect stemmed from the statute's effect of regulating the games
merely based on violent subject matter." They noted that the plot, characters
and content of the game was artistic material-which game companies were
permitted to create, produce and market, consistent with the First Amend-
ment.32 Plaintiffs stressed that, pursuant to the statute, an entire game would be
censored, even if there were only minimal amounts of violent imagery, result-
ing in an unlawful chilling of expressive content." Consequently, Plaintiffs
argued, the statute unconstitutionally chilled speech, was vague, and violated
both the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment34 and
"equal protection."
In contrast, California argued that legislative efforts to regulate the games
were wholly constitutional, based on the state's compelling interest in promot-
ing and safeguarding the health of minors." A great deal of this argument
hinged on the assertion that the games, some of which contained gruesome
virtual images of violence," influenced aggression in minors and psychologi-
Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, at 6.
30 Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, at 7, 15
(arguing that, by using the new labeling requirement, the video game industry would be
compelled to assent to a government message and that "[fjorcing individuals to disseminate
a message on behalf of the State of California violates the First Amendment every bit as
much as restricting the dissemination of individuals' own messages."); see also Graham
Owen, California Commands Conscience: Chapter 638 Violates Violent Video Game Sales,
37 McGEORGE L. REv. 208, 212 (2006).
31 Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, at 14.
32 Id. at 7.
3 Id. at 12.
34 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F.Supp.2d at 1039.
3 Id. at 955-56. The court did not reach the issue of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
issue of impermissibly vague language. Id. at 956.
36 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 8-9, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwar-
zenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448)
(urging application of the variable obscenity standard of review "to preserve[] the liberty
guaranteed by the First Amendment while allowing states to fulfill their duty to protect the
health and welfare of children").
37 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130
S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448) ("The record contains examples of the violent content of
various video games that may be covered by the Act. . .. [one] game involves shooting both
armed opponents, such as police officers, and unarmed people, such as schoolgirls. Girls
attacked with a shovel will beg for mercy; the player can be merciless and decapitate them.
People shot in the leg will fall down and crawl; the player can then pour gasoline over them,
set them on fire, and urinate on them.").
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cally harmed them."
The parties clashed over whether the First Amendment rights of the game
producers should or could be limited when their products were sold to mi-
nors." The parties also argued over the correlation between virtual and real-life
violence, and whether there was a demonstrable causal nexus between playing
violent games and committing real-life violent acts.40 Finally the parties dis-
puted the proper analytical framework and standard of judicial review to
evaluate the video games and the validity of the statute.41
1. Plaintiffs'Arguments in Favor of Striking the Statute
The Plaintiffs argued that video games, as a form of expression, are entitled
to a significant amount of First Amendment protection and that such protection
is sustained, regardless of whether a player is a minor.42 Additionally, Plaintiffs
contended that the statute's definition of "violent" was unclear and that the
statute was "rife with unconstitutionally vague terms" 43 that failed to give rea-
sonable notice of prohibited subject matter." To this end, Plaintiffs cited the
statute's use of imprecise wording such as "virtually inflict serious injury upon
images of human beings or characters with substantially human characteris-
tics" or the proscription against "virtually inflicting a high degree of pain" on
the same types of characters. 45 These unintelligible terms, Plaintiffs averred,
were especially difficult to reconcile within the video game context-where
decidedly inhuman characters such as zombies, centaurs and characters with
magical powers may still have human characteristics. 46 This blurring of human
3 Id. at 2.
39 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958.
40 Id. at 963-64.
41 Id. at 957-58; see also Robert H. Wood, Violent Video Games: More Ink Spilled than
Blood: An Analysis of the 9th Circuit Decision in Video Software Dealers Association v.
Schwarzenegger, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 103, 105 (2009).
42 See Brief for Appellee at 15-17,Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger,
556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The State does not deny that video games are a form of ex-
pression protected by the First Amendment. Nor could it, given the evidence presented and
the overwhelming judicial authority holding as much.").
43 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, at 11.
44 Id.; see also Brief for Appellee, supra note 42, at 48-49 (arguing "the Act contains
two definitions of 'violent' video games. Both are vague. The first definition restricts games
that appeal to the 'deviant and morbid' interest of minors. The statute does not define these
terms, leaving retailers to guess at whether the appeal of a game goes to a minor's 'deviant'
and 'morbid' interests. Similar language has been struck down as vague by other courts,
which have noted that such terms have no defined meaning outside the context of sexually
explicit obscenity.").
45 Brief for Appellee, supra note 42, at 4-5, 7 (providing the examples of the video
games Resident Evil 4 and God of War).
46 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, at 11. Interest-
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and inhuman attributes in both video games and films has made it increasingly
difficult to demarcate whether a character (be it an actual person on the silver
screen or virtual video game character) is human.47 The Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America ("MPAA") argued in support of the Plaintiffs, noted the
conundrum of defining 'human' in terms of modem visual arts, and that other
mediums have used voluntary industry rating systems for decades without the
daunting nebula of content-regulating of censorship.4 8 Amici supporting the
video game associations have also astutely pointed out that several video
games have influenced and fueled the motion picture industry with the advent
of the video game movies, such as the Prince of Persia, Doom, Street Fighter,
Resident Evil, Mortal Kombat and Tomb Raider.49
Additionally, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the labeling provisions of the stat-
ute."o They argued that the requirement to label a game's package "unlawfully
compelled" video game retailers and manufacturers to "disseminate a message
on behalf of the State of California," which Plaintiffs asserted was "not tied to
a legitimate regulatory purpose."" Furthermore, given that the video game
industry has been a self regulated body, like the MPAA and the American As-
sociation for Booksellers, it would seem especially suspect for the state to in-
volve itself in the affairs of content regulation with this form of media.5 2 Plain-
tiffs argued that the statute did not serve a legitimate regulatory purpose and
ingly, the video game associations did not discuss predator aliens or terminators. See A.O.
Scott, A Monotonic Cyborg Learns to Say 'Pantsuit', N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, available at
http://movies.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9F01EFD6143AF932A35754COA9659C8B6
3 (reviewing Schwarzenegger's Terminator Rise of the Machine, as including "a lot of robot
violence, some brief robot nudity and a modicum of human swearing").
47 For example, the title character of the Terminator film franchise featured a "cyber-
netic organism . . . [with l]iving tissue over a metal endoskeleton" who was able to "learn
the value of human life." James Cameron's killing machine was very human-looking, albeit
more muscular, and spawned two follow up films that were among the most successful and
violent films of their era. James Cameron and William Wisher, Terminator 2: Judgment
Day, Screenplay, available at http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Terminator-2-Judgement-
Day.html (last accessed Apr. 6, 2011); See also Paul Ciotti, Real Hollywood Muscle; No
Star Makes More Money, Wields More Power or Has More Fun, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4,
1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-04/magazine/tm-3 7 1 1 _arnold-
schwarzenegger/13 (noting that Schwarzenegger "has been regularly attacked by critics for
making movies that are gratuitously violent, shallow, one-dimensional and politically incor-
rect").
48 Brief for the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. et. al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 9,11, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130 S. Ct.
2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448).
5o Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
5' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, at 5 (discussing the
unconstitutionality of compelled speech).
52 Kevin E. Barton, Game Over! Legal Responses to Video Game Violence, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICs & PUB. POL'Y 133, 147 (2002).
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that California grossly overstepped its role, given a lack of documented evi-
dence as to whether violence in video games actually influence violent acts by
minors." Plaintiffs argued that the video game industry had already developed
sufficient signage and published material54 to educate parents and consumers
about the video game rating system and that the rating process sufficiently ad-
equately addressed parental concerns." Given that rating system had already
received commendation from the Federal Trade Commission, Plaintiffs con-
tended that additional labeling would cause significant hardship and burdens
on industry."
Plaintiffs also relied on a decade of precedent to support their contention
that California's video game statute was unconstitutional." The Plaintiffs ar-
gued that a number of federal appellate cases overwhelmingly supported their
argument that video games are entitled to First Amendment protection, and
that attempts to regulate games on the basis of state and municipally-defined
violent content are impermissible." For example, in American Amusement Ma-
chines v. Kendrick, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
granted an injunction against an Indianapolis law restricting minor's access to
video arcade games, arguing that whatever violent content the games con-
tained, it was insignificant compared to the violence contained in other areas of
pop culture." In Interactive Digital Software Association v. St. Louis County,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down St. Lou-
is, Missouri's video game violence ordinance, which contained language near-
53 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, at 27; Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130
S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448).
54 Brief for Respondents, supra note 48, at 7-9; Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants
Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448). For a concise explanation of the Rating sys-
tem, see Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 769 (8th Cir. 2008); see also
Frequently Asked Questions ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD,
http://www.esrb.org/ratings/faq.jsp# (last visited May 14, 2011).
5 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 8; see also Entm't Software Ass'n v.
Swanson, 519 F.3d at 769. "Titles rated AO (Adults Only) have content that should only be
played by persons 18 years and older. Titles in this category may include prolonged scenes
of intense violence and/or graphic sexual content and nudity." See Game Ratings & De-
scriptor Guide, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD,
http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratingsguide.jsp (last visited May 14, 2011).
56 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27 at 12 (arguing that " to
ensure that the games do not violate the Act, those who import and/or distribute video
games in California would be expected to review the entire possible course of play in a par-
ticular game . . . lead[ing] to a chilling of speech of video game creators, publishers, manu-
facturers, distributors, importers, retailers and consumers").
5 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 960-61.
58 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 53, at 11, Video Software Dealers Ass'n
v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (2008) (No. 07-16620).
59 Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579-580 (7th Cir. 2001).
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ly identical to the California statute at issue in Schwarzenegger.6 o There, the
court rebutted the St. Louis County's argument against protection by the First
Amendment by relying on the violent content in the video games at issue and
the degree of control that allows players to focus on violent action scenes.6'
The government argued that because a player could fast-forward and skip im-
mediately to player-controlled violence, the game was devoid of any worth-
while expressive content that the First Amendment classically protected.62 The
court ruled in favor of the gaming associations, reasoning that the same could
be said of action films, where a viewer can easily isolate violence-laden action
sequences by rewinding, fast forwarding and pausing.
The Plaintiffs in Schwarzenegger also argued that California's arguments
citing obscenity precedent were misplaced, and that the only appropriate area
of First Amendment law from which to assess video game violence are hold-
ings that proscribe the First Amendment to prevent actual violence.' To this
end, Plaintiffs relied heavily on the applicability of the violence-inciting test of
Brandenberg v. Ohio. 65 In Brandenberg, the Supreme Court created a test for
determining whether speech could be restricted based on its tendency to pro-
duce imminent lawless action. The video game association Plaintiffs noted
60 Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 956, 959
("The ordinance, in relevant part, makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to sell, rent,
or make available graphically violent video games to minors, or to 'permit the free play of'
graphically violent video games by minors, without a parent or guardian's consent.").
61 Id. Appellees in the Missouri case conceded that the video games had storylines and
plots, aspects which the Interactive Digital Software Association, in a position akin to EMA
in the Schwarzenegger case, argued were aspects that supported the First Amendment rights
of video games. The games at issue in the case were Doom and Mortal Kombat.
62 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 53, at 21, Interactive Digital Software
Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo.,329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Interactive Digital
Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d at 960 (holding inapplicable the variable
obscenity standard in the context of video game content. "Speech that is neither obscene as
to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.").
63 See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d at 957 (not-
ing the fact that modem technology has increased viewer control does not render movies
unprotected by the First Amendment, and equivalent player control likewise should not
automatically disqualify modem video games that are "analytically indistinguishable from .
protected media such as motion pictures"). Id.
6 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 961; Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 53, at 13, 16-17, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwar-
zenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-
1448).
65 Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
1, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (creating a test for whether speech could be restricted based on its tendency to pro-
duce imminent lawless action).
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that federal courts had frequently employed the Brandenberg test to strike
down violent video game statutes, and that the California statute should meet
the same fate."
Plaintiffs also attacked California's attempt to justify the video game statute
by relying on obscenity precedent to justify content- regulation." The Supreme
Court has held that obscenity is unprotected speech, one of the few exceptions
to the First Amendment." However, obscenity cases, Plaintiffs stressed, per-
tain to controversies involving sexual materials, and not cases where violent
content is at issue.70 Conversely, California argued that video games should be
judged under the variable obscenity standard, which applies a different ap-
proach-labeling materials as "obscene" based on whether or not they are suit-
able for children to view." This variable obscenity approach evaluates whether
a work is obscene based on the audience of that work.72
Lastly, Plaintiffs urged that California could not proffer a compelling state
interest to regulate games, citing the conflicting and inconclusive evidence as
to whether violent video games actually harm minors or motivate real-world
violent behavior, and whether the statute would actually have an effect on re-
ducing aggression." While California emphasized the existence of a correla-
tion of violent acts with players of violent video games through expert witness
Dr. Anderson, Plaintiffs pointed to expert testimony and court opinions in pre-
vious cases in which his exact positions and claims were refuted and method-
ologies attacked.74 In particular Plaintiffs argued that the presence of a correla-
tion did not automatically equate to a causal link." While Plaintiffs acknowl-
edged that California could have a compelling state interest in preventing vio-
lence, they argued that in the video game setting, the declared interest of pre-
venting real world violence was far too attenuated. 6 Ultimately, the Plaintiffs
argued that strict scrutiny should apply, since the video game statute regulated
67 See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1073 (N.D. Ill.
2005); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253-254 (2002).
68 Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 65, at 5.
69 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957).
70 Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 65 at 1.
71 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 957-59.
72 See William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The De-
veloping Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 77 (1960); see also Brief for the
Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 48, at 9-10 (noting that the MPAA util-
izes a variable obscenity standard).
n Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 65, at 8.
74 Id. at 6-8.
7 Id.
76 Id. at 1.
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the content of expression and the video game violence did not pertain to an
excepted class of speech."
2. The Government's Argument for Assessing the Games under Variable
Obscenity
The State of California argued that the statute was a proper and lawful
means to address the harmful impact of certain games which, due to violent
content and subsequent harmful influence, were harmful to minors." California
insisted that the statute should be reviewed under the variable obscenity stan-
dard" and was therefore valid, given the state's compelling interest in deter-
ring aggression and preventing violence among minors." Thus, California ar-
gued, the statute was narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling state
interest in child health and safety, which is threatened by exposure to violent
content."' To support its variable obscenity standard, California relied on Gins-
berg v. New York, a 1968 case where the Supreme Court upheld an obscenity
statute prohibiting the sale of pornographic "girlie magazines."82 These maga-
zines were materials that normally would not be obscene for adults, yet would
be obscene if viewed by minors.
California cited the necessity of exercising state police power to ensure the
health and well-being of minors. 4 California contended that the law recognizes
"that children are not possessed of mental faculties equivalent to adults" and
that there are differing legal ages for driving, smoking, and drinking, as well as
minimum ages of voting, marriage and consent to sexual intercourse." While
n Id. at 4.
78 See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 1 ("California's violent video game
law properly seeks to protect children from the harmful impacts of playing a narrow cate-
gory of interactive video games that, by definition, are so violent that they appeal to a devi-
ant or morbid interest of children and are patently offensive to prevailing community stan-
dards. These games lack any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for chil-
dren, and a substantial body of research has concluded that they have harmful impacts on
the children that play them.").
7 The variable obscenity doctrine evaluates the material with the age of the audience as
the determinative factor of whether the material is obscene. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 636-38.
80 Id. at 7, 24-26.
81 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 1.
82 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); see also Petitioner's Brief at 17-18, Schwar-
zenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448).
83 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673.
84 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958-59.
85 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 9; but see Am. Commc'n Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950) (noting that "control is a copyright of totalitarianism,
and we have no claim to it. It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from
falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into
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the State acknowledged minors' First Amendment rights, they noted the raft of
psychological development between minors and adults. To this end, they
claimed that finding the video game statute unconstitutional would undermine
"well recognized distinctions between the respective mental capacities and
vulnerabilities of adults and children." 6
In response to Plaintiffs' arguments that the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged a different First Amendment standard for minors only in the context of
regulating obscenity, not violence," California skirted around the lack of vio-
lence-specific case law and focused on the potential harm to minors exposed to
violent video games, as well as the special considerations of young video game
players relative to adults. The government argued that the "material need not
be sexual to be considered obscene; it is the harm to the children that is criti-
cal."" Citing footage introduced at trial, California compared violent material
of a villain dismembering and decapitating a victim with a chainsaw to the
sexually obscene image of a "lifeless, beaten, blood-soaked female."" Califor-
nia asserted that the level of gruesomeness of the former amounted to obscen-
ity and was unsuitable for minors, and that permitting the former violence-only
image while forbidding violence with sexuality in the latter image was illogi-
cal. Both examples, California argued, were obscene in the sense of being in-
appropriate, indecent, unhealthy and offensive for minors to view."o
California introduced experts to support the negative effects of violent video
games on minors" and drew attention to the Plaintiffs witness, who admitted
error"); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(finding that "[t]hese concerns apply to minors just as they apply to adults. If controlling
access to allegedly 'dangerous' speech is important in promoting the positive psychological
development of children, in our society that role is properly accorded to parents and fami-
lies, not the State").
86 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 9-10 ("Juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. This is
explained in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less
experience with control, over their own environment.") (citing Steinberg & Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility,
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003).
87 See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recog-
nizing "a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors" which extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not ob-
scene by adult standards"); Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 16.
88 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 15.
89 Id.
90 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 37 at 9-10; see also Joint Appendix
Vol. IV to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1550-51, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Mer-
chants Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448).
91 See Expert Testimony of Dr. Anderson, Joint Appendix Vol. I to the Petition for a




that among "people who play more violent video games, some tend to exhibit
greater aggression."92 Consequently, California contended that "because it was
rational for the Legislature to determine, based upon existing social science,
that the violent video games covered by the law are harmful to children," the
statute did not violate the First Amendment."
C. Holding of the U.S District Court and the Ninth Circuit
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California en-
joined California from enforcing the video game statute.94 California immedi-
ately appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding-the statute was sub-
ject to strict scrutiny review and was presumptively invalid as a content-based
restriction on speech.9 To satisfy strict scrutiny review, California must dem-
onstrate (1) a compelling state interest for imposing its definition and labeling
of the games and that (2) the statute is the least restrictive means for achieving
that interest.97 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court: California
failed to demonstrate a causal link between the statute and the compelling in-
terest and ultimately, California failed to demonstrate that it employed the least
restrictive means of dealing with the supposed adverse impacts of violent video
games on minors." The Ninth Circuit expressed misgivings about the appro-
priate use of Ginsberg and creating a new exception to the First Amendment,
which, the court noted, was essentially what California sought.99 Governor
Schwarzenegger continued to support the video game statute, even as Califor-
92 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 33 (California also cited the transcript
from one of EMA's experts who testified that the "position is 'not that these games do not
lead to [increased aggression], only that [he has not] professionally been convinced of that
yet."').
93 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 1.
94 Video Software Dealers Ass' v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
91 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 952-53.
96 Id. at 967.
97 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 25-26 (stressing that a "compelling in-
terest is not limited to helping parents protect the developing minds of children from expo-
sure to traditionally obscene material, but includes simple nudity . . . and even 'filthy
words"').
98 Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 815; see Thompson v. W. States Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (discussing commercial speech in the context of the pharma-
ceutical industry and advertising).
99 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 959 ("The Ginsberg
Court applied a rational basis test to the statute at issue because it placed the magazines at
issue within a sub-category of obscenity-obscenity as to minors-that had been determined to
be not protected by the First Amendment, and it did not create an entirely new category of
expression excepted from First Amendment protection. The State, in essence, asks us to
create a new category of non-protected material based on its depiction of violence.").
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nia was defeated at the District Court and the Ninth Circuit.100
The case has now progressed to the Supreme Court of the United States and
presents two questions: (1) whether the First Amendment permits any limits on
offensive content in violent video games sold to minors; and (2) whether state
regulation for displaying offensive, harmful images to children is invalid if it
fails to satisfy the exacting "strict scrutiny" standard of review. 0 ' Before ex-
amining the First Amendment as it relates to video games, it is helpful to trace
the development of freedom of speech and freedom of expression precedent.
III. "A TOTAL RECALL" 02 OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Freedom of expression, the centerpiece of the Schwarzenegger v. EMA
case, is governed by the First Amendment."' While the First Amendment may
spans numerous types of expression including political, religious, and artistic
forms, it is not without limitations." Not all types of speech and expressive
content fall within the gambit of protected expression.o' Courts have also con-
sidered the limits on how speech may be expressed based on the time, place, or
00 Press Release, Senator Leland Yee, Ph.D., U.S. Supreme Court to Conference on
Violent Video Game Law (Apr. 21, 2010) (quoting Governor Schwarzenegger as saying that
"[b]y prohibiting the sale of violent video games to children under the age of 18 and requir-
ing these games to be clearly labeled, this law would allow parents to make better informed
decisions for their kids. I will continue to vigorously defend this law and protect the well-
being of California's kids."); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL
2261546, at *12 (N.D.Ca. Aug. 6, 2007); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger,
556 F.3d at 967.
o' Question Presented, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(2010) (No. 08-1448), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-1448.htm.
102 See John J. Puccio and Dean Winkelspecht, Total Recall, HD DVD Review,
DVDTowN.coM, http://www.dvdtown.com/reviews/totlrecll/4318 (heralding Total Recall as
setting the bench mark in gore and violence, in which Schwarzenegger uses "an innocent
bystander as a human shield and a scene where a villain's arms are removed at the elbow")
(last visited May 14, 2011).
103 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
"04 Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) ("The First and Fourteenth
Amendments have never been treated as absolutes.").
105 For example, perjured testimony and bribery are clearly unprotected and the courts
have not had to devote much attention as to their status. See Keith Werhan, Professor Nim-
mer Meets Professor Schauer (and others): An Analysis of "Definitional Balancing" as a
Methodology for Determining the Visible Boundaries of the First Amendment, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 483, 490 (2006) (noting that "laws regulating such things as copyrights, espionage,
monopolies, and perjury are largely unaffected by the First Amendment even though they
may involve speech"); see also Nathan Phillips, Constitutional Law: Note, Interactive Digi-
tal Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County: The First Amendment and Minors' Access to Violent
Video Games, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 585, 586-87 (2004) ("The guarantee of Free Speech
is not absolute; courts recognize limited exceptions: libel and defamation, speech designed
to incite imminent lawless action, fighting words, and obscenity.").
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manner of expression."0 6 Still, the First Amendment enjoys a very hallowed
status and consequently the Supreme Court has also acknowledged the "inher-
ent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression." 0 7
A. Categories of Expression
It is useful to examine a few of the categories of expression in order to un-
derstand the jurisprudential framework under which to evaluate video games.
The first category is communicative expression , which consists of two ele-
ments: words or actions which "convey a particularized message" and the ten-
dency of those words or actions to be understood by those who view or hear
the expression.'
Just as communicative expression may consist of political chants, letters,
and signs, speech may be accompanied by conduct and sometimes consist of
only non-verbal actions, such as a march, sit-in or boycott.' However, com-
bining verbal and non-verbal elements can be regulated if doing so is within
the constitutional power of the government, that the government has a substan-
106 Id. at 492, 504; see, e.g., Adderley v. Florida 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (upholding con-
viction of more than 200 demonstrators who crowded in a private driveway); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 773-74 (1994) (discussing burden on speech in the
context of distance of a protest to an abortion clinic); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 681-84 (1992) (invalidating a ban by the Port Authority on the sale or
distribution of literature in airports, but upholding the ban on solicitation of materials in an
airport terminal); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (arguing
trials must be open to the public including the press); but see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 689-90 (1972) (upholding refusal of reporter to appear and testify before grand jury
with respect to confidential sources without a special showing that such testimony was nec-
essary and noting that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening
of the press that may result from the enforcement of generally applicable laws); see Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271-73 (striking down a contempt for a journalist criticism of a
judge and holding that absent imminent threat of danger to a member of the judiciary or the
administration of justice that such criticism may not be stifled in keeping with the First
Amendment); Craig v. Harney, 328 U.S. 331, 376 (adding "the fires which (the expression)
kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of
justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil."); see
also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-57 (1965) (holding the government has a signifi-
cant interest in assuring efficient administration of justice and thus may ban protests on side-
walks adjacent to the courthouse where the protestors have voiced an intent to disrupt the judi-
cial process); but see Grace v. US, 461 U.S. 171, 180-84 (1983) (holding the city of Washing-
ton, D.C. could not prohibit passage on all sidewalks adjacent to the United States Supreme
Court because the restriction went further than the needs of security justified).
107 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
1os Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (noting that the act of burning
the American flag, although not speech in its typical parlance was an action that "combined
with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken" could be described as
expressive conduct).
109 E.g., N. A. A. C. P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982).
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tial government interest and that the restriction on expression is incidental and
restricts only that which is essential to furtherance of the governmental inter-
est.' 0
Artistic expression has enjoyed a great deal of First Amendment Protec-
tion."' Art forms, such as motion pictures, have battled in the courts for le-
gitimacy as an expression medium,"2 and it took decades for the courts to rec-
ognize them as "within ambit of protection" guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment."'
The Supreme Court has held that government may regulate indecent lan-
guage; patently offensive "dirty words," and "excretory language" on public
radio airwaves because such words are accorded little in the way of First
Amendment protection since they have no real intrinsic value." 4 Governments
may also regulate speech to ensure that broadcasters do not selectively restrict
content from publication."' Therefore, because there is a possibility that dis-
claimers about the broadcast might not be heard, the state may regulate public
broadcasts as a form of nuisance."'
o10 See Christopher J. Andrew, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Devel-
opment, Current Application and Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Prec-
edent, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 1175, 1179-1180 (2002); U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 US 367, 376-77
(1968).
"I See Schad v. Borough of Mount Emphraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("Entertainment,
as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast
by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works fall
within the First Amendment guarantee."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1970)
(noting that in the context of a certain "[flour letter word . . . it is nevertheless often true that
one man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
112 See Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243-
45 (1915) (noting that "the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple,
originated and conducted for profit").
113 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 US 495, 500-501 (1952). Video games are
not wholly unrelated to Hollywood. Amici supporting the video game associations have also
astutely pointed out that several video games have influenced and fueled the motion picture
industry with the advent of the video game movies, such as the Prince of Persia, Doom,
Street Fighter, Resident Evil, Mortal Kombat and Tomb Raider. See Brief of the Motion
Picture Association of America et. al. supporting Respondents at 29, Schwarzenegger v.
Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448) (arguing that, "[w]hether
the motion picture or the video game comes first, the increasing overlap in visual elements,
themes, and storylines renders it more difficult to draw clear lines between the two media.
At a minimum, therefore, any restrictions on the content of video games would inevitably
have some effect on the content of corresponding motion pictures.").
114 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 US 726, 743, 746 (1978).
11s Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391-93 (1969).
116 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-50.
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B. Tailoring Statutes to Conform to First Amendment Protections: Vagueness
and Overbreadth
In regulating expression, the government walks a fine line between regulat-
ing types of conduct and abridging the protections of freedom of speech. The
following are areas that frequently come into play for First Amendment chal-
lenges and also appear in Schwarzenegger v. EMA.
Since the underlying purpose of the First Amendment is to encourage the
free flow of speech and expression, a regulation that is overbroad will be found
unconstitutional."' Overly broad regulations have the potential to stifle sub-
stantially more expression than is required to effectuate a legitimate state ob-
jective."' Although a law "may be constitutionally applied to the activities of a
particular defendant, that defendant may challenge it on the basis of over-
breadth, if the law sweeps within the ambit of protected speech, or expression
of other persons not before the Court.""
The doctrine of vagueness is a sibling of overbreadth-when the scope of a
law scope is unclear, it discourages the public from engaging in expression out
of the legitimate fear that doing so would violate the law.'20 Consequently, to
regulate speech, government must clearly indicate the type and nature of the
proscribed speech, as well as the legislature's objective for regulating in a giv-
en area.121
" See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (8th Ed. 1999) ("The doctrine holding that if a
statute is so broadly written that it deters free expression then it can be struck down on its
face because of its chilling effect-even if it also prohibits acts that may legitimately be
forbidden.").
118 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[E]ven though the governmental
purpose may be legitimate and substantial, the purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved").
119 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 933 (1975). For example, consider a legisla-
ture which, in the interest of law enforcement, passes a statute prohibiting all loitering or
picketing: such a statute would be overbroad and invalid on its face. Such a sweeping pro-
scription would chill First Amendment freedoms by prohibiting even peaceful picketing.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-105 (1940); see John F. Decker, Overbreadth Out-
side the First Amendment 34 N.M. L. REv. 53, 83-84 (2004) (containing overbreadth doc-
trine's evolution). In the same vein, an ordinance proscribes speech that potentially inter-
rupts police business "in any manner" would also be overbroad. See Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451, 454 (1987) (finding the wording of the law at issue did not give sufficient notice
as to what constituted an interruption with official police duties).
120 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (explaining that "where a
vague statute 'abuts upon sensitive areas of First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to
inhibit the exercise of those freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer
far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked."').
121 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1034 (2d ed.) The Foundation
Press, Inc. 1988; see also Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (noting
that a statute is invalid when it is "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessar-
ily guess at its meaning"); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (discussing
612 [Vol. 19
20111 Terminating First Amendment Proscriptions on Video Games
The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck statutes for being unconstitution-
ally vague.122 In the seminal case, Butler v. Michigan, the Court struck down a
statute criminalizing the distribution of material "tending to the corruption of
the morals of youth."'23 The Michigan statute punished sales of books "tending
to the corruption of the morals of youth" and, the Court held that the text of the
law was so vague as to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'24 The Court emphasized the need for restricting the statute's
scope to achieve its intended objective.'25
The Supreme Court's most noted obscenity case, Miller v. California is
known for providing a standard on determining whether material is obscene'26
but defines obscenity with language that relates to sexuality without treatment
of violence.'27 Thus, while the Supreme Court has evaluated glorification of
violence, it has predominantly evaluated controversies where the violence was
sexually based.' Similarly, the variable obscenity standard considers material
that is harmful to minors, including violence, but does so in the realm of sexu-
ality, without mentioning violence or brutality apart from sexual contexts.129
Drafting a statute that is neither vague nor overbroad to restrict the behavior
of on screen characters is not an easy task. While the California statute pro-
scribes violent actions against characters that have human-like characteris-
tics,' there have also been attacks on statutes which prohibit "human-on-
facial overbreadth and holding that the overbreadth in a statute "must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep").
122 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1086-87 (2d. ed. 2005).
123 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381-82 (U.S. 1957).
124 Id
125 Id. at 383 (overturning a statute which effectively "reduce[d] the adult population of
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.").
126 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (stating the test as "(a) whether 'the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
127 Id. (setting forth the rubric for evaluating laws that potentially limit speech, "[a]s a
result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or
describe sexual conduct"). In the Schwarzenegger case, the State of California concedes that
the Supreme Court has never created a First Amendment exception for purely violent mate-
rial. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 16 (providing "[t]he Supreme Court
has never expressly incorporated violent images (absent a sexual element) into the 'obscene
as to minors' exception, but neither has it rejected this logical extension").
128 Frederick Schnauer, The Second Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. I
(1989); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem.,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
129 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 637-643 (regarding pornographic images that
the pictures were 'harmful to minors').
130 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1746-1746.5.
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human violence.""' The daunting prospect of drafting video game statutes is
further complicated when one considers violent imagery in cartoons and mo-
tion pictures.'32 Parties in the Schwarzenegger case, as well as amici have dis-
tinguished cartoons from video games."' Others have aptly noted that a "Tom
& Jerry or Road Runner cartoon" is substantially different than video games in
which a character can rape, brutally beat, and decapitate others.'34 There also
exists the challenge of squaring creative material laden with violence, and
questions arise as to whether depictions of the realistic criminal and military
violence should somehow be distinguished from fantasy brand violence. In the
Schwarzenegger case, Plaintiffs highlighted how various art forms have had to
defend their legitimacy and newer avenues of expression are associated with
the wave of suspicion of being a catalyst for societal ills."'
C. Legislation aimed at Reducing Violent Media
There have been numerous calls for regulation of violence in the media."'
131 See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F.Supp.2d 1051,1057 (N.D. Ill.
2005).
132 Brief of American Booksellers Foundation For Free Expression et. al., as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Respondents, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(2010) (No. 08-1448).
13 Brief of First Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19,
Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448).
134 See Timothy F. Winter, Op-Ed., The Government Should Stop Kids From Buying
Violent Video Games, U.S. NEWS (May 10, 2010)
http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/05/10/7twotakesprocopy.html.(constrasting
cartoons with violent video games in which characters rape, decapitate, and set others on
fire).
1s See Brief of Respondents at 26, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger,
556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448); THOMAS
HINE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN TEENAGER 190 (Harper Perennial 2000). During
the California's portion of oral argument, Justice Scalia commented, in the midst of a dis-
cussion as to whether cartoons departed from a historically acceptable amount violence
behavior noted, "[t]hat the same argument could be made when movies first came out. They
could have said, oh, we've had violence in Grimm's fairy tales, but we've had it live on the
screen. I mean every time there's a new technology you can make that argument." Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 7-8, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 130 S. Ct.
2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448).
136 Federal oversight of video games has been a prevalent topic with Senators Schumer,
Kyl and Clinton all calling for increased controls and regulation. Senator Clinton who en-
couraged the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the impact of the game Grand Theft
Auto urged that the violent games were causing a "a silent epidemic" of behavior. See Clin-
ton seeks 'Grand Theft Auto' probe, Jul. 14, 2005, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-07-14-clinton-game x.htm (discussing
Clinton's call for labeling certain games as 'Adult Only' as well as imposing a $5000 dollar
penalty rather than the $1000 penalty that the California statute called for); see also Tom
Curry, Clinton Burnishes Hawkish Image, MSNBC (July 14, 2005)
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8573139/ns/politics-tom curry/.
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Lawmakers are aware that children are exposed to violence. This exposure was
so great that Congress and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
took notice.' Section 551 of The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was
passed because parents desired greater control over their children's exposure to
violence.' In response to parental concerns, the FCC introduced the V-chip,
which helped parents filter violent content by blocking television programming
based on a program's rating. "'
While the FCC acknowledged the need for regulation of television violence,
it cautiously chose to make the ratings guidelines voluntary, noting that
"forced participation in content-based regulation of speech runs headlong into
the First Amendment."' 40 Traditionally, other efforts at curbing exposure to
violent content have been voluntary as well, driven by parental supervision or
industry self-regulation.1' Plaintiffs in the Schwarzenegger case have cited the
FTC's approval of the current video game ratings and have suggested that the
California statute would "have the perverse effect of undermining the quality
and availability of information currently provided to parents and minors about
game content."'42 Plaintiffs also stressed that self-regulation has long been ac-
137 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 551 ("Studies indicate
that children are affected by the pervasiveness and casual treatment of sexual material on
television, eroding the ability of parents to develop responsible attitudes and behavior in
their children. . . . Parents express grave concern over violent and sexual video program-
ming and strongly support technology that would give them greater control to block video
programming in the home that they consider harmful to their children. . . . There is a com-
pelling governmental interest in empowering parents to limit the negative influences of vid-
eo programming that is harmful to children.").
131 In re Implementation of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order,
FCC 98-35, CS Docket No. 97-55 at 1 (Mar. 13, 1998) ("Congress determined that parents
should be provided with timely information about the nature of upcoming video program-
ming and with the technological tools that would allow them to easily block violent, sexual,
or other programming they believe is harmful to their children. Congress also provided that
distributors of video programming should be given the opportunity to develop a voluntary
system to provide parents with ratings information.").
139 President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union (Jan. 23, 1996). See also FCC V-Chip, http://transition.fcc.gov/vchip/
(providing a history of V-chip proceedings at the FCC) (last visited May 14, 2011).
140 Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, Commissioner, Fed. Comm. Comm'n, In re Implementa-
tion of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Video Programming Ratings
(Mar. 12, 1998), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/Statements/sthfr809.txt.
141 Brief of Respondents, at 7-9, 53-54; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MARKET-
ING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A SIXTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY
PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES, 2
(2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/12/P994511violententertainment.pdf
142 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN:
A SIXTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, Music RE-
CORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES, 2 (2009), available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/2009/12/P994511violententertainment.pdf. The ESRB system has
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cepted in the visual arts, and that the music industry has for decades imple-
mented its own rating system for lyrics that are unsuitable for minors.143
D. Regulation of Speech to Prevent Harm and Violence: From Television
Remote to Game Controls
In order to understand how the Supreme Court will analyze video game stat-
utes, it is essential to understand the First Amendment protections afforded to
violent speech. Speech or expressions which tend to incite violence are not
protected by the First Amendment'" and expression that advocates lawless
action is subject to the Brandenburg test.'45 Courts may properly limit violent
speech that is likely to incite violence; it is insufficient that the speech merely
incite fear or the possibility of illicit acts.'46 Fighting words encompass speech
expressed in a face-to-face setting to provoke retaliatory violence by another
person.'47 In contrast to other forms of speech, these words are not normally
part of a dialogue, nor are they essential components in the "exposition of ide-
as." 4 8 Thus, because the value of these expressions is likely to be so low, and
the "social interest in order and mortality" of maintaining peace is so great,
fighting words are subject to proscription.149 However, the Supreme Court has
pointed out that that there are limits on this doctrine; the mere fact that speech
may stir anger or invite dispute is not reason to silence speech under the pre-
been very effective according to the FTC report. The 2009 FTC study found that "the video
game industry outpaces the movie and music industries in the three key areas that the Com-
mission has been studying for the past decade": (1) "restricting target-marketing of mature-
rated products to children;" (2) "clearly and prominently disclosing rating information;" and
(3) "restricting children's access to mature-rated products at retail." Id at 30.
143 Justice Sotomayor, during the course of the State of California's case at oral argu-
ment for Schwarzenegger v. EMA posed the question whether a state could regulate the
offensive language in rap music. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135, at 9. Rap
music, a genre that received much public critique for glorification of violence, has influ-
enced numerous universities to offer course work analyzing rap's cultural impact. For ex-
ample, The Textual Appeal of Tupac Shakur. See The University of Washington, Instructor
Class Description, available at http://washington.edu/students/icd/B/bis/351gmr2.html and
http:www.washington.edu/students/icd/S/chid/480gmr2.html.
144 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (noting that states may not "forbid or proscribe advo-
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
145 Id.; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 US 886, 927-28 (1982).
146 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1926) ("Fear of serious injury cannot
alone justify suppression of free speech. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression
of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced.").
147 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 573-74 (1942).
148 Id. at 571-72.
149 Id. at 572.
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vention of violence doctrine.'s
As a general rule, a state may place reasonable limits on the "time, place
and manner" of speech so long as the restrictions are "content neutral."' A
key component of the Schwarzenegger v. EMA case focuses on the constitu-
tionality of the video game statute and how speech is chilled by the Legislature
through the chosen statute, rather than through less restrictive means such as
the denial of a permit.'52
E. Government Regulation of Speech: Strict Scrutiny and Rational Basis
To contextualize the issues involving regulation of speech, it is helpful to
examine the standards used to evaluate regulation of expressive content. Ar-
guments over the appropriate level of scrutiny proved critical in the lower
courts, '" and amici have continued to put forth arguments over whether or not
strict scrutiny should apply to the video game statute. 154
The determination of the appropriate type of judicial review is often de-
pendent on the language of a law and how that law regulates expressive con-
tent. Laws targeting particular actions, as opposed to speech, generally pass
muster and will be upheld even if they restrict speech in some way."' If the
government can posit a significant government interest, it may regulate speech
without running afoul of the First Amendment."'
150 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 27 (1949); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
550-51 (1965) (noting that if a speaker is stirring a crowd to riot, his or her violence-
inducing words may not be silenced if law enforcement can effectively contain the crowd);
but see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 325-328 (1951)(noting that if speech causes the
imminent escalation of spectator violence which cannot be satisfied by crowd control and
the speech is the apparent cause of an impending disorder, the fighting word doctrine ap-
plies and the speech may be constitutionally suppressed).
151 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. at 791.
152 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 953.
153 Id at 957-58.
154 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America in Support of Respondents at 2-3, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzeneg-
ger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448);
Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in Support of Peti-
tioners at 8 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448).
1ss See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (upholding a New York statute
authorizing closure of bookstore that was used in connection with a prostitution ring; the
law was directed at the crime of prostitution not toward any expressive conduct related to
the reading or selling of books); compare Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota, 460
U.S. 575 (1983) (striking a tax on the bulk sale of newsprint and news ink as singling out
the press for special taxation).
156 See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989); see
also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 414 (1997). Another ex-
ample is a Vietnam-era case, United States v. O'Brien, in which the Supreme Court upheld a
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Actions that regulate content generally weigh in favor of a private litigant.'
The government may not regulate speech "because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content"' and if a private litigant is able to plead and
prove content regulation, such an argument is generally fatal to the regula-
tion."' This is because actions that regulate content are subject to strict scru-
tiny.1o
Over time, precedent has developed content-guarding controls to prohibit
the government from regulating to promote or suppress the message underly-
ing the speech.' 6 ' This means the government must "[s]how that its regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling [governmental] interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end." 62 Professor Volokh explains that the impli-
cations of narrow tailoring entail the following:
Essentially factual questions about whether the law is indeed narrowly
drawn: does the law further the interest; is the law limited to speech that impli-
cates the interest; does the law cover all such speech; are there less restrictive
alternatives that will serve the interest equally well?'16
California faces a significant battle at the Supreme Court by arguing that the
Legislature had a compelling state interest in passing the video game statute. In
Schwarzenegger v. EMA, video game association Plaintiffs have insisted that
the California statute is impermissible because it regulates content, while the
criminal statute prohibiting the destruction of a military draft card. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370, 386 (1968). The Court found a significant governmental inter-
est in maintaining an efficient selective service system and that the law prohibiting destruc-
tion of the card was passed with no illicit legislative intent to curtail the First Amendment.
Id. at 377 (noting that "if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest").
'5 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 845 (2006).
158 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975).
159 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 55 (2000).
160 Id.
161 See R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992) (holding that the gov-
ernment may not regulate hate speech, regardless of its offensiveness, where the regulation
is "based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed"); see
also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 701 (1977) (cautioning against de-
veloping a tautology that lumps all offensive speech into the category of obscenity).
162 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,191, 211 (1992) (upholding state law
prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign literature
within 100 feet of a polling place upheld as applied to the traditional public forum of streets
and sidewalks); see also Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123
(1991) (striking a Son of Sam law, after finding the state has a compelling interest but the
law is not narrowly tailored).
163 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2424 (1996).
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government argues that it had a compelling interest in passing the statute to
safeguard minors from violent content." California attempted to avoid strict
scrutiny review by arguing that the Ginsberg variable test applied; pursuant to
Ginsberg, a government need not prove a compelling interest.' However, a
great deal of the argument for the compelling state interest is the assertion that
the video games negatively affect the health of minors, though there is cur-
rently little agreement in the scientific community as to whether a correlation
between virtual and real life violence exists.'"
IV. PREDICTING THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE: 'GAME OVER'
FOR VIOLENT VIDEO GAME STATUTES
Although this area of First Amendment law is new to the Supreme Court,
several decisions of the lower district courts and federal appellate circuits have
decided to grant protection to video game manufacturers.
As Clay Calvert points out, "states across the nation seem fixated on limit-
ing minors' access to violent images and plots in video games.""' State laws
aimed at curbing minors' access to violent video games, like the violent video
game statute in Schwarzenegger, have been enjoined and frequently found un-
constitutional in federal district courts' 8 as well as federal circuits.6
In Kendrick, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit con-
sidered an ordinance designed to regulate the entry of minors into public video
arcades as a means to prevent minors from playing violent video games.'70 The
164 Brief of Respondents, supra note 135, at 13-17; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 86, at
56.
165 See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 14 ("To sustain state power to ex-
clude material defined as obscene by [the statute] requires only that we be able to say that it
was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the
statute is harmful to minors.") (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641) (emphasis in Appellant's
Opening Brief).
166 Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574-77 (7th Cir. 2001);
see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135, at 6 ("Well, do you actually have
studies that show that video games are more harmful to minors than movies are?").
'67 See Clay Calvert, The Two-Step Evidentiary and Causation Quandary for Medium-
Specific Laws Targeting Sexual and Violent Content: First Proving Harm and Injury to
Silence Speech, Then Proving Redress and Rehabilitation Through Censorship, 60 FED.
COMM. L.J. 157, 160 (2008).
168 See, e.g., Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081-83
(N.D. Ill. 2005); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 647 (E.D. Mich.
2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072-73 (D. Minn. 2006);
Entm't Software Ass'n v. Henry, 2007 WL 2743097, at *9 (E.D. Okla. 2006); Video Soft-
ware Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190-91 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
169 Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2008); Interactive
Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2003).
170 Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 573-74.
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ordinance featured language similar to the California video game statute and
like California's statute, contained sections that purported to define violent acts
and graphic violence."' A majority of the Seventh Circuit noted that the legis-
lative basis of the video game ordinance was the "belief that violent video
games cause temporal harm by engendering aggressive attitudes and behavior
which might lead to violence."' 72 Judge Posner emphasized that there was in-
sufficient evidentiary grounds to link the aggression-laden video games with
real life psychological harm and propensity to commit violent acts.'"
The ability of governments to sustain challenges to video game statutes con-
tinues to have its own vicious cycle because of the judicial reluctance in con-
sidering whether such laws would have any beneficial effect. Judges have been
dismissive about whether there is any need to prove causation and correlation
because they often accept Plaintiffs arguments about content regulation and
are swift to label such theories as conjecture.' 74
Whether or not a showing of correlation or causation is necessary, it is a dif-
ficult burden to meet, even in cases where real-life violence has occurred."
Some courts have declined to enforce ordinances similar to California's video
game statute,' while others have rejected attempts to impose tort liability aris-
ing out of incidents where litigants alleged that video games caused violence.'"
171 Id. at 573. The relevant part of the statute restricted a minor's use of "an amusement
machine that predominantly appeals to minors' morbid interest in violence or minors' pruri-
ent interest in sex, is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for persons under the age of eighteen (18)
years, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as a whole for persons un-
der' that age, and contains either 'graphic violence' or 'strong sexual content."' Id.
172 Id. at 575.
17 Id. at 578-79 ("There is no indication that the games used in the studies are similar to
those in the record of this case or to other games likely to be marketed in game arcades in
Indianapolis. The studies do not find that video games have ever caused anyone to commit a
violent act, as opposed to feeling aggressive, or have caused the average level of violence to
increase anywhere. And they do not suggest that it is the interactive character of the games,
as opposed to the violence of the images in them, that is the cause of the aggressive feelings.
The studies thus are not evidence that violent video games are any more harmful to the con-
sumer or to the public safety than violent movies or other violent, but passive, entertain-
ments.") (emphasis in original).
174 Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 579-80.
175 See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 687-88, 699 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding
"intangible thought, ideas and messages" conveyed by movies, video games and Web site
materials were not "products" for the purpose of strict liability in tort). In James, a 14 year-
old-boy who brought a gun to his school, shot and killed three and wounded five others was
found to regularly play 'Doom,' 'Quake,' 'Castle Wolfenstein,' 'Redneck Rampage,'
'Nightmare Creatures,' 'Mech Warrior,' 'Resident Evil,' and 'Final Fantasy,' interactive
computer involving shooting virtual opponents. Id.
176 E.g., Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051,1081-82 (N.D. Ill.
2005); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655 (E.D. Mich. 2006);
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
17 Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 381-82 (6th Cir.1990) (holding a game manufac-
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Even for gruesome incidents in which murderers were allegedly video game
fanatics, courts have declined to recognize new brands of tort liability arising
out of video games."'
The violent video game playing habits of the belligerents in the 1999 massa-
cre at Columbine High School focused national attention on the gaming indus-
try and how shooter games, such as Doom, influenced the attack."' A mael-
strom of media indictments against the games ensued, with talks of regulation
of the games, rather than, gun control dominating a national dialogue." A
class action of the estates of murdered Columbine students brought suit against
video game manufacturers such as Acclaim and Time Warner, alleging that
video games induced the shooters' violent proclivities.'"' Ultimately the court
held the video games were entitled to First Amendment protection and that
there was no proof of a causal link between the games and the shooters' violent
proclivities. 182
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to frame
their arguments regarding the appropriate judicial review in light of the Turner
Broadcasting v. Federal Communications case."' While Turner involved a
very different statute, Turner clarified that the government must identify with
specificity the harm it seeks to address when passing a law (such as the Cali-
fornia video game statute and the objective ensuring health and safety of its
minor citizens) and prove that the law will provide redress for the harm that the
government seeks to remediate.'84
turer did not have any duty under Kentucky tort law to anticipate and prevent the suicide of
a disturbed video game player because such idiosyncratic reactions are not legally foresee-
able. The Court held that, to impose liability in such circumstances "would be to stretch the
concept of foreseeability . . . to lengths that would deprive them of all normal meaning.");
see also Timothy Dylan Reeves, Tort Liability for Manufacturers of Violent Video Games:
A Situational Discussion of the Causation Calamity, 60 ALA. L. REV. 519, 536 (2009).
178 Timothy Dylan Reeves, Tort Liability for Violent Video Games, 60 ALA. L. REV. 519,
at 527, 540-44 (2009)(arguing psychologists have found strong correlations between violent
video games and violent behavior and as such tort liability should be imposed on manufac-
turers these games);. see also James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d at 694 (declining to
recognize a special relationship between a video game developer and the victims of a video
game player who was allegedly induced by the game to commit acts of violence).
179 Matt Bai, Anatomy of a Massacre, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1999, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/1999/05/02/anatomy-of-a-massacre.html (last visited May 14,
2011); see also Gregory Kenyota, Thinking of the Children: The Failure of Violent Video
Game Laws, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 785, 790-91 (2007-2008).
180 See Elliot I. Portnoy, Corporate Citizenship: A Conversation Among the Law, Busi-
ness and Academia, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 767 (2000-2001) (criticizing "Congress, over a dozen
states, and hundreds, of local communities" for attempting to ban or restrict access by kids
to video games with violent themes in the wake of school violence).
18I Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 1268 (D. Colo. 2002).
182 Id. at 1272-75.
'8 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 37 at i.
184 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 664.
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It is unlikely that California will be able to demonstrate that its video game
statute "will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."' After
all, its sister states have passed practically identical laws yet all have been en-
joined and the Supreme Court chose not to disturb the holdings in those
states."' Additionally, many of the lower courts have firmly relied on Turner's
framework and the states continually were unable to prove a direct causal rela-
tionship in the violence phenomena. "
Furthermore, there is a difficulty in applying obscenity and sexuality stan-
dards to violence contexts. In Kendrick, Judge Posner explained that violence
was a fixture of society, and in particular that minors were inevitably exposed
to violence through a variety of mediums.'" This exposure to violence in our
society makes it unlikely that the Supreme Court will rule that video game vio-
lence could be regulated as obscenity. Aside from judicial controls and safe-
guards protecting freedom of expression, the mold of First Amendment prece-
dent for unconventional speech has long been shaped by determinations of
whether content has such a high degree of offensiveness, that it rises to a level
of obscenity.'89 The Supreme Court has evaluated the offensive nature of mate-
rials, examining whether the expression taken as a whole lacks serious "liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value."'
While the defendants in Schwarzenegger v. EMA argued that violent video
games contain obscene low-value expressions that are unsuitable for minors,"'
some courts have recognized the usefulness that games have in exposing mi-
nors to good and evil and the struggles inherent in a violent world.'92 in some
185 Id
186 Adam Liptak Justices Debate Video Game Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3. 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/03scotus.html; see Heather Horn, Violent Video
Games Come Before the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Violent-Video-Games-Come-
Before-the-Supreme-Court-5608 ("The court's decision just days later to hear the video
game case, Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association, No. 08-1448, was
thus a surprise, particularly as lower courts have been unanimous in saying similar laws
violated the First Amendment.").
187 See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d at 956
("Yet when the government defends restrictions on speech 'it must do more than simply
posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured."') (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512
U.S. at 664).
188 Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (ar-
guing that the city of Indianapolis would concede the point on minor's exposure to violence
and noting that "[v]iolence has always been and remains a central interest of humankind").
189 Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1857,
1858-59 (2007).
190 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23; Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556
F.3d at 953.
191 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 37 at 6-10.
192 See Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 577.
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cases, such as Kendrick, judges have extolled the utility that video games pro-
vide through exposing children to what is a very real world that is filled with
violence. 19
Obscenity and its progeny, such as the variable obscenity standards, have
origins in laws attempting to prohibit distribution materials depicting sexuality,
i.e. pornographic materials. Under the Miller v. California test, these are mate-
rials that appeal to the prurient interest in sex.'94 Conversely, materials depict-
ing sexuality can offer "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."' For example, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that education
materials and entertainment may not be prohibited solely because it features
human nudity."' On the other hand certain materials are devoid of First
Amendment protection, often to shield minors from exposure to sexual materi-
als or to discourage child pornography.'"
However, courts have carefully excluded violent imagery on its own from
the definition of obscenity.'" While pornography itself can be difficult to as-
sess in terms of First Amendment and speech suppression, anything related to
child pornography typically is suppressed out of the state's compelling interest
in the safety and health of minors.'99 For example, the Supreme Court unani-
mously ruled in New York v. Ferber that, regardless of whether a statute was
overbroad or under inclusive, that a state could proscribe the distribution of
child pornography and effectively engage in content regulation since such con-
'93 Seth Schiesel, Courts Blocks Laws on Video Game Violence, N.Y. TIMES, August 21,
2007, at El; Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 577.
194 Miller, 413 U.S. 25; see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 497
(1985) (holding the prurient interest cannot embody merely normal interests and that only
depictions which appeal predominantly to shameful or morbid interests in sexuality). The
lack of clarity as to what is legally prurient has continued with video game violence cases.
See also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135 at 4; see Ward v. Illinois 431 U.S. 767
(1977) (holding it unnecessary for the courts to provide an exhaustive list of sexual conduct
descriptions which may be held to be obscene; it is enough if a legislature adopt the prongs
of Miller "if the statute need only describe kinds of proscribed sexual conduct it adds no
protection to what the Constitution itself creates. The specificity requirement as described in
Miller held out the promise of a principles effort to respond to the vagueness argument").
1 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
196 Id. at 26 (citing "medical books for the education of physicians and related personnel
necessarily" with graphic illustrations as an example); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S 153, 161
(1974) (noting that "nudity alone" does not place otherwise protected material outside the
shield of the First Amendment protection").
'97 New York. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755-59 (1982).
198 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 959-60.
199 See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., 492 U.S. at 124 (recognizing government's
ability to regulate constitutionally protected speech when states have enunciated a compel-
ling interest to protect minors); see also, Tony Mauro, Supreme Court to Examine 5 First




tent was the product of a patent illegality.20
While case law and Supreme Court precedent associate obscenity with sex-
ual materials, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also recognized
that in "'common speech', the word 'obscene' is often just a synonym for re-
pulsive with no sexual overtones."20' Despite the acknowledgement of every-
day use of the word "obscene" courts have not read this common parlance into
their opinions. 202 On the contrary courts, including the Ninth Circuit in
Schwarzenegger, have explicitly held that they will not extend obscenity law to
include violent instead of sexually explicit material.203
California has argued in Schwarzenegger v. EMA that the Supreme Court
should apply the variable obscenity standard articulated in Ginsberg v. New
York. In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court imparted a new dimension to obscenity,
holding that while pornographic material is not obscene for adults, it trans-
forms into obscenity when sold to a minor and does not receive the full protec-
tions of the First Amendment.2" Further, in the context of child pornography
there are no First Amendment protections whatsoever.205 However, the Ninth
Circuit in Schwarzenegger dismissed California's reference to Ginsberg,
stressing that the line of obscenity concerns violent content in the context of
sex-related materials-not violence in and of itself.206 Senator Yee, who intro-
duced the bill, noted in a comment on First Amendment concerns that the
Ginsberg case was not completely on point with video game violence.207
200 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747 (holding that "child pornography is unpro-
tected speech subject to content-based regulation").
201 Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001).
202 Id.
203 Eclipse Enter., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 66 (2nd Cir. 1997) ("We decline any
invitation to expand these narrow categories of speech to include depictions of violence");
see also James v. Meow Media Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
court would not "extend . .. obscenity jurisprudence to violent instead of sexually explicit,
material"); see also Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F.Supp.2d 646 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (holding that a "[d]isgusting or degrading" test for obscenity could not be applied
outside context of sexually explicit material, and thus could not serve as basis for content-
based legislation criminalizing dissemination to minors of "ultra-violent explicit video
game[s]").
204 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 635-36.
205 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-246 (2002) (discussing the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 and noting that, "as a general principle, the First
Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear. The
freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including
defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children").
206 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 960-61.
207 See Violent Video Games: Sales to Minors: Hearing on Bill AB 1792 Before Cal. S.
Judiciary Comm., 2005 Leg. (2005) (statements of Senator Yee), available at
ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab 1151-
1200/ab 1179 cfa_20050908 123731_sen comm.html (noting that "the obscenity standard
that was tailored to child-specific standards in Ginsberg could not be equally applied here").
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Given the unsteady grounds of California's argument, the Supreme Court
will likely affirm the holding of the Ninth Circuit. In the decades since the Su-
preme Court began handing down obscenity and violence cases, we have never
seen a melding of the two doctrines. Violence has proliferated our culture, with
images of violence and gruesome stories filling the news cycle. Further, "vio-
lent" is difficult to define and when legislatures have attempted to define vio-
lent in the video game context, they are immediately challenged and fare no
better than the alleged virtual victims of the games they seek to regulate.208
Even if there's plausibility that virtual violence could influence real world
youth violence, it appears that the Court will not undertake any balancing to
carve a new video game exception. Recent decisions at the Supreme Court lev-
el indicate that the Court is not willing to water down strict scrutiny as a test on
regulation of speech. In Stevens v. United States, Chief Justice Roberts cau-
tioned against adopting free floating tests for First Amendment coverage, as
doing so would be a dangerous impingement on the scope of the right.209 In
Stevens, the Supreme Court held that depictions of animal cruelty in so-called
"crush" videos were not unprotected speech and that Court would not weigh
the merits of the videos against the their alleged indecency.2 0 Specifically, the
majority noted that the court would not endorse "categorical balancing of the
value of speech against its societal costs" even if the speech at issue concerned
gruesome depictions of cruelty.211
Nevertheless, the aim of California's video game statute is to protect minors,
and the Supreme Court has held laws can be subject to different standards
when minors are involved. While constitutional rights are shared by all persons
in the United States irrespective of their age, First Amendment jurisprudence
recognizes contexts and environments where speech can be curbed.2 2 There
208 See, e.g., Entm't Software Ass' v. Granholm, 426 F.Supp.2d at 655-56.
209 See Stevens v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) ( "The First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judg-
ment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government out-
weigh the costs."); see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 29 (discussing the context of obscenity, and
that "no amount of 'fatigue' should lead us to adopt [a] convenient 'institutional' ration-
ale").
210 See Stevens v. United States, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
211 Id. at 1585.
212 Minors still have First Amendment rights and many First Amendment cases have
centered on expression in the school setting, often with squaring a student's freedom of
expression with a school's interest in promoting an environment conducive to learning and
comportment. The Supreme Court has taken up this topic as well and has expressed concern,
where "students in the exercise of First Amendment rights, collide with the rules of the
school authorities." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507,
(1969); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-73 (protecting a
story about teen pregnancy published in a school newspaper); Guiles ex rel. Guiles v.
Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 322-325 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied by 127 S. Ct. 3054 (2007); see
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are also a collection of cases recognizing that while disclosure of criminal acts
involving minors can have deleterious effects, such sensitivity does not auto-
matically trump the First Amendment. 213 To impede publication, the govern-
mental party must satisfy strict scrutiny, thus typically states are unable to jus-
tify prohibitions on publication.214
Judge Posner, writing for a majority of the Kendrick urged that video games
are but a small piece of the mosaic of violence in popular culture. 215 Further
some studies have indicated that certain games, which incidentally are violent
may even be beneficial to youths, particularly in the games that give players
creative control and games in which they interact with other players to set plots
and landscapes. 216 A recent study, published after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Schwarzenegger v. EMA, found that video games (including vio-
lent ones) might help youths deal with stress and depression, possibly leading
to a decrease in violent and aggressive activity. 217 The study also labels the
media fervor on video game violence as "'much ado about nothing' " given the
statistically minimal risk that violent games would contribute to real life vio-
lence.'
The Schwarzenegger case has been dominated by arguments over whether
or not there is sufficient empirical evidence to indicate that prolonged exposure
to video games will either affect minor's mental health and or whether the
games will lead to increased aggression.219 While the government urged that
also Arnold H. Loewy, The Use, Nonuse and Misuse ofLow Value Speech, 58 WASH & LEE
L. REV. 195, 198-99 (2001).
213 See Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 97, 101 (1979) (finding that the
state's asserted interest did not survive strict scrutiny); see Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524
(1989) (upholding a newspaper's first Amendment rights to publish the name of the victim
of a rape and striking the State's rape shield law, which failed under strict scrutiny).
214 Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. at 102, 105 (noting "decisions demonstrate
that state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy consti-
tutional standards").
215 Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001).
216 Talmadge Wright, Eric Boria and Paul Breidenback, Creative Player Actions in FPS
Online Video Games: Playing Counter-Strike, Game Studies (Dec. 2002)
http://www.gamestudies.org/0202/wright/.
217 Christopher J. Ferguson and Stephanie M. Rueda, The Hitman Study Violent Video
Game Exposure Effects on Aggressive Behavior, Hostile Feelings, and Depression, EURO-
PEAN PSYCHOLOGIST 2010 Vol. 15(2):99-108 at 106, available at
www.tamiu.edu/-cferguson/hitman.pdf ("Violent games may provide a mechanism through
which players can assert control over a virtual environment, offsetting feelings of helpless-
ness or lack of control over real life, as well as hostile feelings arising independently or as
sequence of depression. Violent games, by providing both a means of aggressively demon-
strating dominance and clear goal-directed behavior, may provide a particularly good me-
dium by which the impact of real-life frustrations on depressed mood and hostile feelings
may be reduced.").
218 Id
219 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 963-64.
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studies by Dr. Anderson indicated that there was plenty of evidence for the
California Legislature to rely on in passing the video game statute,220 Plaintiffs
argued that the studies produced inconclusive evidence and even if there was a
chance that some minors might be affected there was statistically no basis to
believe that video games, taken together with other potential catalysts would
actually cause violence. 22' Furthermore, Plaintiffs cited various federal cases
which struck down ordinances similar to the California video game statute and
in all of the cases, Dr. Anderson's research was found to be insufficient to jus-
tify the video game statues. 22
While these cases involve publication of materials rather than the interactive
element in video games, the Supreme Court has also evaluated cases in similar
genres namely video recordings involving what many would consider distaste-
ful acts. 223 However, obscenity is already an established area of unprotected
speech,224 whereas video game laws are relatively recent. A more extreme ex-
ample of this distinction is evident in child pornography. New York v. Ferber, a
pivotal case in child welfare law, illustrates that safeguarding the psychological
well-being of minors has been a compelling issue for the court. 225 However,
even with the special considerations that children engender for legislatures the
Supreme Court has quoted lower courts, cautioning, it "is essential that legisla-
tion aimed at protecting children from allegedly harmful expression . . . be
clearly drawn and that the standards adopted be reasonably precise" so there
can be no problems with vagueness and overbreadth.226
220 The Appellant's Opening Brief at the Ninth Circuit level gave extensive attention to
the studies by Professor Anderson. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 21-22
("The research shows that playing violent video games increases aggressive behavior and
cognition, and leads to aggressive affect, cardiovascular arousal, and decreases in helping
behavior. In the face of this extensive evidence, it cannot be said that it was irrational for the
Legislature to determine that the violent video games covered by the Act are harmful to
minors.") (internal citation omitted). In Schwarzenegger v. EMA, Justice Kagan also appears
to have taken notice of the lack of conclusive date resulting from these studies. During oral
argument, she posed the hypothetical question of whether a study identifying movies as
violent as video games would enable the state to enact similar statutes limiting access to
films. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135, at 6.
221 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 53, at 34-35, Video Software Dealers
Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(2010) (No. 08-1448) (noting that the expert testimony failed to "demonstrate either a sub-
stantial or a causal connection between 'violent' video games and aggression") (internal
citations omitted).
222 Id. at 34-35.
223 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
224 Brief of American Booksellers Foundation For Free Expression et. al., as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Respondents, supra note 132, at 8.
225 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
226 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689-690 (1968) (citing
People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 313 (N.Y. 1965)).
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However, the evidentiary battles that video game statutes have faced are
very different than the demonstrable evil of child pornography in minors. Per-
haps this is because with child pornography the harm at issue so "overwhelm-
ingly outweighs the expressive interests at stake that no process of adjudication
is required" and consequently "the balance of competing interests is already
struck."2" Nonetheless, the Court has noted that the Ferber decision did not
rest merely on interest analysis, but on the fact that child pornography was so
intrinsically linked to actual child abuse, "an activity illegal throughout the
nation."' Just how intrinsic is this link and how much of a link would the par-
ties in Schwarzenegger need to show? Perhaps the more appropriate vantage
point with video game violence is to think of the harm as something that "does
not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon some unquantified
potential for subsequent criminal acts."229
Lastly, the tone and subjects of debate at Oral Argument suggests that the
clock is running out for violent video game regulations. Oral Arguments for
Schwarzenegger v. EMA were held at the Supreme Court on November 2,
20 10.230 The Court's line of questioning mirrored lower courts holdings, sug-
gesting that the Ninth Circuit will be upheld. For example, during the course of
the State of California's argument, the State clarified that it was requesting that
the Supreme Court uphold a statute permitting the Legislature to restrict a mi-
nor's ability to purchase "deviant violent video games." 231' Justice Scalia noted
that such request was difficult given that, historically there are no established
norms of violence and, like Judge Posner, harkened back to Grimm's Fairy
Tales which were filled with violent imagery.232 Some justices expressed reser-
vations about setting new parameters for violent content in video games, rea-
soning that doing so could open up a Pandora's box of regulations in other art
forms, especially motion pictures which have featured a self-rating system for
decades.233
Justice Sotomayor expressed misgivings whether it would be prudent to al-
low a state to regulate video games questioning whether this would prompt
regulation in other forms of entertainment where violence is featured, such as
rap music.234 Additionally Justice Sotomayor expressed doubts as to whether
the statute could survive strict scrutiny and whether the statute would accom-
227 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
228 See Stevens v. United States, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
229 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002).
230 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135, at 1.
231 Id. at 4.
232 Id. at 4 ("Some of the Grimm's fairy tales are quite grim, to tell you the truth").
233 Id. at 5.
234 Id. at 9.
628 [Vol. 19
20111 Terminating First Amendment Proscriptions on Video Games
plish its stated objective.235 She suggested software developers need only insert
a non-human like feature onto a character to avoid running afoul of the video
game statute.236
While the Justices voiced concern over video games being a new technology
and as such difficult to square with older First Amendment precedent, these
same arguments, EMA urged were made with technologies such as motion
pictures when they were new.237
Overall, the justices did not appear inclined to create a new First Amend-
ment exception for violent video games, or even violent content, yet they did
not completely foreclose the possibility that additional studies and clear evi-
dence could translate to a significant governmental interest in the future. Thus,
while the game may be over for the State of California, the Justices empha-
sized that the deficiencies in the State's argument are based on the current evi-
dence.23
Moving beyond the focus of causation, correlation and statutory construc-
tion, the Plaintiffs in Schwarzenegger v. EMA also face difficulty in attempting
to argue that certain video game content on the "whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value."239 Video game developers have been vo-
cal about their concerns and have steadfastly argued that "exploration and self-
discovery available through books and movies is magnified in video games by
the power of interactivity."240 Consider the myriad of video games, which de-
spite enabling the player to kill or maim may encourage are placed in a histori-
cal context such as World War II and motivate the player to learn more about
history.24'
235 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135, at 58.
236 Id. Justice Sotomayor posed whether a non-human character such as a Vulcan would
come into the definition of a human being as the video game statute was written. Justice
Sotomayor underscored the difficulty of enforcing the language of the statute juxtaposed
against the creativity of video software writers. Id.
237 Id. at 37 (noting that other expressive avenues have met with harsh criticism and have
fought hard for legitimacy); see also id. at 36 (noting a "new medium that cannot possibly
have been envisioned at the time when the First Amendment was ratified.); but see Am.
Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7 th Cir. 2001).
238 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135, at 37.
239 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 497 (1985).
240 E.g., Daniel Greenberg, Why the Supreme Court should rule that violent video games
are Free Speech, WASH. PosT (Oct. 31, 2010 12:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/29/AR2010102905315.html ("Mature-rated games such as
'BioShock,' 'Fable 2' and 'Fallout 3' go far beyond allowing players to engage in imaginary
violent acts; they also give players meaningful consequences for the choices that they
make.").
241 A search on MobyGames.com for "WWIl" yields thirty-one results, while a search




Would these be devoid of any value?242 Consider a shooter game based on
World War 1I. Clearly World War I was filed with appalling violence, yet it is
also a time we tend to romanticize for heroism-an era that has continually to
fueled scholarship as well as our artistic outlets of expression. Would a video
game have less value than say the gruesome depictions of war's agony in Pi-
casso's Guernica its graphic depiction of war's agony? Can any content be de-
void of value if notwithstanding gore and war it might serve as "gateway for
further exploration" of history or culture?243 What about violent video games
which have even been marketed to attract adherents to certain religions?2" Val-
ue aside, the Supreme Court appears poised to not allow video game statutes to
advance "to the next level."
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is likely to hold that video games are a subcategory of
expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment protection. The lower courts
have generally agreed that such statutes violate the First Amendment, and the
State will be found to have overstepped its role, due to the inability to demon-
strate a causal link between video game violence and real-life violence-which
has been difficult to prove even in instances in which teens have committed
actual violence. Furthermore, any arguments that apply to the obscenity con-
text do not apply in this context, given that violence and sex imagery is differ-
ent than violence-only imagery. Finally, at oral arguments, the Supreme Court
indicated that it leaned towards striking the statute. All of this suggests that the
Supreme Court will declare "Game Over" for violent video game statutes.
242 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 86, at 6 (arguing the restricted games are "material
with no redeeming value for children").
243 See John Gaudiosi, Academics hope history in video games spurs interest, REUTERS,
Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/articlelidUSTRE5ABIKF20091112.
244 CNET Reviews, War in Heaven, CNET, http://reviews.cnet.com/pc-games/the-war-in-
heaven/1707-9696_7-30781770.html (last visited May 14, 2011).
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